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JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018

TAGS: [KACT](#) [PARM](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [US](#) [RS](#) [UP](#) [BO](#) [KZ](#) [ZR](#) [ZP](#)
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SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: U.S.-HOSTED RECEPTION, JULY 23, 2008

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States
Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

11. (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-015.

12. (U) Meeting Date: Tuesday, July 23, 2008
Time: 6:00 - 8:20 P.M..
Place: 41 Quai Wilson, Geneva

SUMMARY

13. (S) The U.S. JCIC Delegation hosted a reception on July 23, 2008, and engaged members of the other Parties' Delegations in discussions on a wide variety of topics that included: U.S. participation in P5 plus 1 negotiations with Iran, JCIC issues, post-START, the political dynamics in Moscow, the upcoming U.S. election, B-52 heavy bomber eliminations, intrusive security procedures at the Ulan Ude Point of Entry (POE), and the deactivation of deployed SS-25 ICBMs. The general impression of the U.S. Delegation was that the delegates from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan did not avoid conversations with their U.S. counterparts and were not reluctant to engage on substantive issues.

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN P5
PLUS 1 POLITICAL DIRECTORS
MEETING WITH IRAN

14. (S) Koshelev asked Taylor whether he had had an opportunity to discuss the events of the past weekend with Under Secretary Burns. (Begin comment: The weekend event referred to the meeting in Geneva of the P5 plus 1 Political Directors with Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Saeed Jalili to

receive Iran's response on the P5 plus 1 proposal that had been delivered in Tehran last month. End comment.) Taylor said that he had not been part of the discussions and had not met with Under Secretary Burns. Koshelev lamented that it had been a very difficult weekend. It was always a very difficult task when dealing with the Iranians and this weekend was no different. He had been involved with the talks, working until 1:00 AM on Sunday morning and then again from 9:00 AM until 10:00 PM on Sunday night. Koshelev said that Kislyak had remarked that Jalili had been very impressed that the United States had sent Under Secretary Burns to the meeting. While Jalili had taken a hard line during the discussion on Saturday, it seemed that on Sunday in the follow-up meeting with Kislyak, Jalili had been more conciliatory. Jalili had assumed that the opening position by the P5 plus 1 would be whether Iran had a right to a peaceful nuclear program. Kislyak had finally convinced Jalili that the decision had already been made -- a peaceful nuclear program was possible, but Iran had to cease its provocative actions. Nothing could be accomplished until that occurred. Koshelev informed Taylor that Kislyak felt it was vitally important that Under Secretary Burns was in attendance at the meeting as it demonstrated unity within the P5 plus 1.

POSSIBILITY FOR A
ROOD-KISLYAK MEETING

15. (S) Koshelev told Taylor that Kislyak had agreed to meet with Rood in August, if the United States had anything new to offer on Ballistic Missile Defense or Post-START. Koshelev said that Kislyak was taking leave during the first week of August and he was scheduled to depart his current position on September 5, in preparation for his new assignment as the Ambassador to the United States. If the meeting took place, Koshelev was planning to recommend to Kislyak that an additional item (Obligation to Meet to Consider Whether the START Treaty Will be Extended) be added to the Rood-Kislyak agenda. Koshelev added that he believed it was important that the United States and Russia address this issue in a constructive manner so that this issue could easily be resolved. Koshelev stated that it was the legal opinion of Russia that it did not matter what form or level of meeting, but that it should include all five Parties to the Treaty and that they be specifically instructed to act on the question.

16. (S) Koshelev also told Taylor that if the Rood-Kislyak meeting did not take place prior to the departure of Kislyak, he would recommend that the meetings take place at the Antonov-DeSutter level, as the individual being considered as Kislyak's replacement was unfamiliar with the issues we deal with and would not be prepared to discuss them in detail.

JCIC ISSUES

17. (S) When asked if he would be continuing as the JCIC Representative, Koshelev told Taylor that he would continue as the Moscow Treaty's Bilateral Implementation Commission representative; however, Vladimir Yermakov would be assuming the duties as the representative to the JCIC. Koshelev later told DeNinno that Yermakov, who had just returned to Moscow from the Russian Embassy in Washington D.C., was expected to take over JCIC duties sometime in the future. Koshelev remarked that he currently worked many strategic issues, particularly in the areas of missile defense and arms control. He said he had also recently participated in the P5 plus 1 discussion at the United Nations with Iran. Yermakov's assumption of the JCIC position was expected to provide Koshelev more time to oversee other issues.

18. (S) Couch asked Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min and Col Akulenok about the Ukrainian plan to reuse SS-24 ICBM solid rocket motor cases as a result of reaching agreement on additional

elimination procedures during this session. Kuz'min stated that he did not know Ukraine's plans and the Ukrainians would more likely tell the United States before they told Russia, given the current state of Russian-Ukrainian relations. He added that he did not know why the Ukrainians wanted to reuse the motor cases, because the material used to make those cases was not environmentally friendly and was very hazardous. He said that Russia preferred to simply destroy solid rocket motor cases so that it did not have to deal with resulting environmental issues. Kuz'min and Akulenok both indicated that they would retire in the next year.

¶9. (S) Smith discussed the issue of B-52 eliminations at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB) with Kuz'min and Zaytsev. He reminded them that the Russian Federation had expressed concerns during the last JCIC session regarding several B-52 heavy bombers that, in its view, had begun the process of elimination and the Russian Federation had not been notified so that an elimination inspection could be conducted. He also reminded them that this issue had been fully explained by the United States, so it was understood that the issue had been resolved. Specifically, the bombers in question had not begun the process of elimination since the cuts that had been accomplished on the bomber were not done at a location obviously not an assembly joint and that these aircraft were under going aging surveillance. Smith also reminded them that the Russian Federation had indicated that this issue had been clarified and would no longer be written up as an ambiguity in the inspection reports. He informed them that, during the most recent Data Update inspection at Davis-Monthan AFB, Russian inspectors had written the same ambiguity into the official inspection report. He asked if there had been some confusion on the part of the United States concerning this issue. Kuz'min replied that the Russian Federation was still concerned about the cuts that had been accomplished on the bombers and the view was that the elimination process had begun. Smith noted that he could understand Russia's concerns if the United States were trying to take credit for an eliminated bomber and remove it from the MOU, but in this case the bombers remained fully accountable and fully inspectable. Both Kuz'min and Zaytsev stated that they understood, but Russia still had concerns. When asked if this issue would be raised at the JCIC again, they responded that it would not be during this session.

¶10. (S) Fortier informed Kuz'min and Ryzhkov that the U.S. inspection team that recently conducted a Reentry Vehicle On-site Inspection at the Dombrovskiy Silo ICBM Base was able to view the interior of a deployed SS-18 silo launcher declared not to contain an ICBM that had been covered with dirt. Fortier thanked Kuz'min and Ryzhkov for the actions taken by the Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (RNRR) to ensure that the inspection-related issue discussed during the last JCIC session was resolved. Kuz'min responded that he was glad that U.S. inspectors had no difficulties getting through the hatch because, no matter how hard they tried, the silo door was not going to move. He commented that the Strategic Rocket Forces had not appreciated receiving orders from the Russian NRRC, particularly when those orders resulted in more access for U.S. inspectors, but the NRRC would continue to work to ensure U.S. inspection teams receive the rights permitted under the Treaty.

POST-START: LESS CONTROL
AND MORE COMMUNICATION

¶11. (S) Ryzhkov thanked Fortier for the assistance he had provided in resolving the Drovyanaya site diagram issue. Fortier expressed his hope that the same type of candid discussion and cooperation could be exercised in the future to resolve other issues. Ryzhkov responded that he shared that hope, since many issues still needed to be resolved before START went away. Fortier inquired as to specifically when he foresaw START actually going away. With a large grin, Ryzhkov replied, "...when we agree to a replacement with less control and more communication."

¶12. (S) DeNinno, Gondol and Tessier spoke to Koshelev regarding what Russia would like to see in a post-START agreement. Koshelev stated that Russia continued to wait for a response to its last proposal from November that outlined Russia's position. It would be difficult for Russia to make suggestions without seeing a U.S. response. Koshelev mentioned that the Russian Federation had been informed by a group of former U.S. Democratic politicians that it would be better to hold off until the current U.S. administration leaves office, so Russia viewed the situation as a waiting game. DeNinno said he understood that Russia was looking to continue limitations on delivery vehicles and was interested in simplifying the existing START treaty. Koshelev responded that Russia was not interested in maintaining all of the complex provisions of START, but would need agreement on definitions. Russia and the United States have different understandings of the meaning of many terms. Koshelev continued that it would also be necessary to maintain control of all warheads, including those in a non-deployed status because Russia was concerned about a refire or reload capability. Using his hands, Koshelev gestured and stated that U.S. warhead levels would be up here and Russian warhead levels down here or perhaps even lower. He continued that a way also needed to be found to distinguish between whether a delivery vehicle was equipped with a nuclear or non-nuclear warhead, that it was not just a matter of what type of warhead, but the delivery vehicle as well. Gondol asked whether Russia was honestly still worried about getting into a war with the United States. Koshelev replied that nobody in Russia wanted a nuclear war with the United States and everybody understood that a nuclear war would be a catastrophe. However, one must be prepared for all eventualities. He expressed his hope that Russia and the United States would never be on opposite sides of any shooting war (nuclear or non-nuclear) and would be on the same side of any future conflict. Koshelev opined that the decisions made on START would be very important since the rest of the world looked very carefully at what the United States and Russia did in the field of disarmament.

MISSILE DEFENSE AFFECTS
STRATEGIC STABILITY

¶13. (S) Shevchenko told DeNinno that the United States and Russia understood that both countries possessed the nuclear firepower to overcome any current form of missile defense. The problem was the effect of U.S. missile defenses on strategic stability. Shevchenko stated that times had changed and the type of stability today could not be compared to that which existed during the Cold War. After the fall of the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons were removed from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, U.S. allies, such as Great Britain and France, still possess nuclear weapons.

THE REIGN OF THE
DOUBLE-HEADED EAGLE

¶14. (S) Yaguchi, Gondol and DeNinno engaged Koshelev, Zaytsev and Akulenok in a discussion on the political dynamics in Moscow. Koshelev expressed his opinion that, while Medvedev was still young and less experienced than Putin, Putin was a better diplomat with a broader understanding of world politics. Putin had also surrounded himself with the right people and structure to fulfill his duties as Prime Minister. DeNinno questioned whether Medvedev and Putin simply switching roles was a recipe for a power struggle as it provided Putin the authority to continue where he left off. Koshelev believed that it was beneficial to Russia to have both in power and that, although there were concerns that

possible inter-party struggles could arise in the future, the new structure would allow Putin to fully implement the policies that he had put in place during his term in office.

He continued that Putin may pay more attention to domestic policy initially, but would still play a role in foreign policy because of his experience. Putin would be coaching Medvedev for some time. Koshelev opined that the Russian Federation had made a good decision in bringing Ushakov back from the Russian Embassy in Washington to be an advisor to Medvedev. Koshelev subsequently told Taylor and Brown that Ushakov would not be taking Lavrov's position. He was now a personal advisor to President Medvedev and would remain in that circle of very close advisors. He was one of Russia's most experienced advisors in foreign affairs and one of the most skilled Russian diplomats.

¶15. (S) Kotkova told Brown that it was likely that Kislyak's post would be assumed by another deputy minister rather than someone (like current Arms Control Department head Antonov) promoted up into that position. Koshelev noted to Taylor that Kislyak had a generally negative attitude about negotiations in Geneva and was reluctant to approve sending Russian diplomats here for prolonged periods, adding that Kislyak had remarked about the lack of results historically achieved considering all of the time delegations spent in Geneva. This attitude, at least about the city of Geneva, was apparently turned around in Kislyak's mind when he finally spent some time in Geneva and enjoyed the city and stayed in \$18,000 USD per night accommodations during the P5 1 talks with Iran over the past weekend. Koshelev informed Taylor and Brown that his boss, Anatoliy Antonov, had told him of his favorable impression of Taylor during the Rome talks, citing Taylor's professionalism and even-handed but forceful manner.

THE UPCOMING U.S. ELECTION

¶16. (S) Zaytsev, Koshelev and Akulenok asked DeNinno, Yaguchi and Gondol as to who they believed would be the next U.S. President and who each was going to vote for. Not receiving a quick response, Koshelev joked that was a question that Americans never seemed to be able to answer. Koshelev continued that it would be good for the rest of the world to have some predictability with the Republican Party, since that was the party that was currently in power. It was not that the Democratic Party did not have anything good or bad to offer, but the current party provided consistency and predictability since the world knew what to expect. Akulenok implied that the success of Obama was not a surprise since the Americans were simply ready for any change.

CURRENT U.S.-
RUSSIAN RELATIONS

¶17. (S) DeNinno, Yaguchi and Gondol also engaged Koshelev, Zaytsev and Akulenok in a discussion on the current relationship between the United States and Russian Federation. Koshelev remarked that our countries needed to find a way to operate on a level of continuity. DeNinno inquired as to whether there was a particular area that needed to be focused on, with the response from Akulenok and Zaytsev being that there was no issue in particular -- such as economics -- that should take priority, but rather

continuity on all issues. Koshelev responded by using the P5 1 negotiations with Iran as an example, stating that it was important to talk with Iran because there was a generation of young people in Iran who shared the same interests as we did, such as in technology and personal freedoms. He continued that there were some who still believed that bears roamed the streets of Moscow. Having lived in India for five years helped him to better understand and relate to the Indians and their culture. He opined that Russia and the United States needed to communicate better on a basic and more personal level to increase understanding by the people. While big decisions were made by political leaders, the average person or even mid-level functionaries

made a difference. The more they understand about each other, the better things would be. Russia and the United States were in agreement and understood each other on many current issues in the short term, such as terrorism and nonproliferation. However, the long term did not provide much in terms of lasting stability.

INTRUSIVE SECURITY PROCEDURES
AT THE ULAN UDE POE

¶18. (S) Smith explained to Ryzhkov that U.S. inspection teams were being subjected to extreme security procedures when exiting the Ulan Ude POE. These procedures included asking to see inspector notes, which was clearly not permitted by the Treaty, as well as searches of all personal luggage and requests to remove items from the inspectors' pockets. Smith understood the need for security procedures, but could not understand the need in this case since U.S. inspectors were leaving the country and boarding their own military aircraft. Ryzhkov acted very surprised and asked why he had not been notified of this situation before now. He had no knowledge of these occurrences and if he had known earlier he could have fixed it. He said what was happening was inappropriate, that he would fix it, and apologized as a professional member of the Russian NRRC that these actions had occurred.

DEACTIVATION OF SS-25s
AT NIZHNIY TAGIL

¶19. (S) Fortier discussed with Smirnov and Kuz'min issues associated with current SS-25 deactivation activities. Fortier expressed confusion regarding the deactivation activity occurring at the Nizhniy Tagil Road-mobile ICBM Base. Although information received through various notifications and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program suggested that only one restricted area at Nizhniy Tagil was to be eliminated this year, Russia had recently transmitted two START notifications indicating that the elimination of fixed structures at two restricted areas began simultaneously on July 3, 2008. Fortier asked whether Russia intended to remove nine or 18 road-mobile SS-25 ICBMs from service at Nizhniy Tagil this year. Smirnov responded that only two units of nine SS-25 ICBMs (one at Novosibirsk and one at Nizhniy Tagil) were to be deactivated this year. The activity at Novosibirsk was nearly complete and the deactivation of nine at Nizhniy Tagil had started on July 4, 2008. Responding to Fortier's question concerning the validity of the START notifications indicating the simultaneous initiation of elimination of all fixed

structures at two restricted areas at Nizhniy Tagil on July 3, 2008, Smirnov expressed his belief that the superstructures of all 18 garages would be disassembled, with the foundations of only nine garages being destroyed this year and the other nine next year. (Begin comment: The abrupt change in Smirnov's tone, facial expression and avoidance of eye contact when the discussion shifted to the fixed structures, gave Fortier doubts regarding the accuracy of what he had just said. End comment.)

UKRAINIAN FRUSTRATION
WITH NATO MAP

¶20. (S) Oppenheim spoke with Dotsenko (staff of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine) and Bondarenko regarding Ukraine's bid for a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). Dotsenko expressed frustration, stating that there was the general sense that Ukraine had done what NATO had asked but to no avail because their efforts had been undermined. Bondarenko immediately injected that Ukraine's two main obstacles were France and Germany. Dotsenko

continued that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense had made many changes in accordance with the advice and guidance received from NATO consultants, but was still rejected. Perevezentsev told Comeau that Ukraine was internally divided into two clear camps on the subject of NATO membership, one that favors NATO membership and one that strongly opposes.

WHO ARE THESE CHARACTERS?

¶21. (S) Dunn spoke with Oleg Serov about his position within the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and his current and previous areas of responsibility. Serov reported that he was responsible for strategic forces and missile defense issues. This was his first time in Geneva. He had previously been assigned to the Russian Embassy in Washington (no further information), as well as the Embassy in Beijing. (Begin comment: Serov stated he speaks Chinese also. End comment.) Serov currently participates in the Six-Party Talks on the denuclearization of North Korea. When asked how discussions within the JCIC compared with discussions within the framework of the Six-Party Talks, Serov laughed and commented that there was no North Korea participating in the JCIC, and indicated that Russia finds it difficult working with the North Korean delegation. Regarding future strategic stability between the United States and Russia, Serov stated that Russia is optimistic about working with a new U.S. administration on a more equal basis, and being able to work the totality of issues between the United States and Russia. As an example, he pointed to the connection between strategic nuclear forces and missile defenses, noting that Russia did not possess such defenses. In that regard, he questioned the necessity for deployment of U.S. missile defense assets in Europe, and commented that Russia was closely watching the participation of European nations in the U.S. ballistic missile defense program. Serov stated that he expected to return to Geneva for future JCIC sessions. (Begin comment: Serov was very personable and spoke excellent English. End comment.)

¶22. (S) Dunn also spoke briefly with Vladimir Lapshin, who described some of his responsibilities. Lapshin reported that he works in the United States-Canada office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a representative from that office always participated in meetings of the JCIC. Lapshin had participated in meetings in Geneva in the past, though it had been a number of years since he last did so. His areas of responsibility have included the United States and Canada, Eastern Europe, and arms control and disarmament. He was stationed in San Francisco with his family for three years. He referred to having one son, who, based on context, was at least a teenager. (Begin comment: Lapshin spoke excellent English. End comment.)

¶23. (S) Comeau spoke briefly with Aleksey Perevezentsev. Perevezentsev previously worked in the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington, D.C. for a year and had since moved back to Ukraine and was currently employed in the Ukrainian Presidential Office where he works in the International Relations/Law area. He was previously married for a few years, but was recently divorced. He speaks very good English.

¶24. (S) Violetta Yevarovskaya told Fortier that, although she had never been to the United States, she recently returned from visiting her brother in Mexico, where he worked in the Russian Embassy.

¶25. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR

NNNN

End Cable Text